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ABSTRACT. On 20 September 2002, an enormous rock/ice slide and subsequent mud-flow occurred on
the northern slope of the Kazbek massif, Northern Ossetia, Russian Caucasus. It started on the north-
northeast wall of Dzhimarai-Khokh (4780ma.s.l.) and seriously affected the valley of Genaldon/
Karmadon. Immediate governmental actions, available scientific information, first reconstructions,
hazard assessments and monitoring activities as well as initial expert judgments/recommendations are
documented in order to enable more detailed analyses and modelling of the event by the wider scientific
community. Among the most remarkable aspects related to this event are (1) the relation between the
recent event and somewhat smaller but quite similar events that occurred earlier in historical times
(1835, 1902), (2) the interactions between unstable local geological structures and complex geothermal
and hydraulic conditions in the starting zone with permafrost, cold to polythermal hanging glaciers and
volcanic effects (hot springs) in close contact with each other, (3) the erosion and incorporation of a
debris-covered valley glacier largely enhancing the sliding volume of rocks, ice, firn, snow, water and
probably air to a total of about 100106m3, and (4) the astonishingly high flow velocities (up to
300 kmh–1) and enormous length of travel path (18 km plus 15 km of debris/mud-flow). This
extraordinary case illustrates that large catastrophic events in high mountain regions typically involve
a multitude of factors and require integrated consideration of complex chains of processes, a task which
must be undertaken by qualified groups of experts.
INTRODUCTION
In the evening (shortly after 2000h local time) of 20 Septem-
ber 2002, a large rock/ice slide took place on the northern
slope of the Kazbek massif, Northern Ossetia, Russian
Caucasus. From the north-northeast wall of the summit of
Dzhimarai-Khokh (4780ma.s.l.), steeply inclined meta-
morphic rock layers were detached, entraining snow, firn
and ice from steep hanging glaciers. Smaller but frequent
precursory events had lasted several days to weeks and had
heavily covered the surface of Kolka glacier at the foot of the
wall with fresh mud and rock/ice debris. The main event
sheared off the glacier and enlarged the initially detached
mass with large amounts of snow/firn/ice, morainic material
and water. After sliding along a trajectory of about 18 km,
the moving mass together with additionally eroded debris
from talus and slope deposits was strongly compressed at the
entrance of the Genaldon gorge (1300ma.s.l.) near the
village of Karmadon. There, it ejected a debris/mud-flow
which continued for another 15 km through the Genaldon
gorge and into the Giseldon valley (Fig. 1). More than 120
people were killed (including a film crew at work near
Karmadon), and the access road through the Giseldon valley
and Genaldon gorge – one of the region’s main tourist
attractions – was destroyed. The compressed slide deposit of
>100106m3 dammed the river, causing the formation of
several lakes. The largest of these new ice/debris-dammed
lakes, with a volume of several million m3, inundated parts
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Fig. 1. Schematic map and situation after the event with names of
most important sites. Quickbird image of 25 September 2002.
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of the village of Gornaia Saniba at the right (eastern) side of
the valley near Karmadon. It also constituted a growing
threat to the population of the down-valley town, Gisel.
As is often the case with such dramatic events, rumours
(often from diffuse sources) and controversies immediately
started within the population, the media and the scientific
community (Kotlyakov and others, 2004a, b; Petrakov and
others, 2004; cf. also notes by M.G. Berger, L.V. Desinov,
M.U.Nikitin and others, D.A. Petrakov and others, C.Huggel
and others, and R.A. Chernov and K.P. Rototaeva in GRNO-
A, 2004). The main points raised concerned whether
1. the event was related to similar catastrophic slides in
1835 and 1902 from the same mountain,
2. it was a repetition of the scientifically investigated and
documented 4.5 km surge of Kolka glacier in 1969/70,
3. the catastrophe could thus have been foreseen by the
government and preventive actions taken,
4. a similar or even larger event could occur again in the
immediate future and constitute a threat to rescue
personnel in the zone of destruction,
5. outbursts of lakes dammed by the slide deposits could
trigger devastating flood waves and destroy or damage
the down-valley settlement of Gisel, and
6. what the appropriate steps would be to avoid further
catastrophic events in the future.
The government of North Ossetia thus started collaboration
with the Hazard Prevention Group of the Swiss Humanitar-
ian Aid Unit and the Russian Academy of Sciences. During a
visit to the site from 2 to 6 October 2002 a first assessment
was prepared and issued to the government and the media,
in order to clarify the situation for the people in the region.
At the same time, plans were initiated to build continued
cooperation with respect to hazards, climate-change effects
and environmental aspects in the high mountains of the
Ossetian Caucasus. Since then, several reports on partial
aspects of the event have appeared (Desinov and others,
2002; Haeberli and others, 2003; Ka¨a¨b and others; 2003b;
Popovnin and others, 2003; Kotlyakov and others, 2004a, b;
Petrakov and others, 2004), and an international conference
on related aspects was organized in June 2004 at
Vladikavkaz (GRNO-A, 2004). It is now clear the catas-
trophe constitutes an event of historical dimensions that
must be reflected in glacier and permafrost hazard research
in high mountain areas. This paper aims at compiling the
most important facts in order to open the possibilities for
further analyses and international exchange of information
concerning events such as occurred here.
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS
Disaster-area visits during the first days after the event by
experts on ice and water hazards helped to assess the
situation. Close collaboration between the experts and
representatives of the regional administration allowed
definition of a list of priorities for monitoring the situation
and forecasting the most probable scenarios.
The first information about the event was received by the
duty officer of the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) of
the Republic of North Ossetia–Alania from the inhabitants of
Gisel, and from the control point of the energy company
Sevkavenergo which reported the breakdown of the high-
voltage lines from the Ezmin hydroelectric power station to
Karmadon at 2013h Moscow time (Figs 2 and 3). During the
night, the MES service, the officers of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and the local population activated search-and-rescue
operations in the region of the water scoop of Gisel. The
Search and Rescue Service (SRS) of North Ossetia recon-
noitred the Karmadon gorge via the Fiagdon river route and
found that a slide involving a huge mass of ice had occurred.
At 0700 h on 21 September an MI-8 helicopter of MES
made the first flight over the region. The chief of MES was
the first to conclude there had been a rock/ice slide from the
area of Kolka glacier, provoked by the collapse of one of the
hanging glaciers at the Maili-Khokh–Dzhimarai-Khokh
ridge. The next flight over the region, by experts from the
Department of Natural Resources and Preservation of the
Environment, carried out aerial inspections and a photo and
video survey of the area. These observations enabled the
Fig. 2. Avalanche deposits at Karmadon. The overridden lower
village and the former research station are at the lower left of the
image; the partly inundated village of Gornaia Saniba is to the right
(cf. Fig. 3). The entrance to the narrow Genaldon gorge, where the
mud-flow started from the compressed avalanche, is in the upper
centre of the image. Photo: I. Galushkin, 22 September 2002.
Fig. 3. Drowned houses in the lake dammed by the avalanche at
Gornaia Saniba. Photo taken by Ministry of Natural Resources,
North Ossetia, 25 September 2002.
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dimensions of the event to be determined. Simultaneously,
groups of geologists carried out ground observations using
the Fiagdon routes to the region of the sanatorium,
Karmadon, and via Chmi village to the region of the
settlement, Gornaia Saniba. According to MES, the ice/rock
slide followed by the debris/mud-flow completely destroyed
11 dwelling houses, a three-storey bath building, the
Karmadon sewage disposal plant, a mineral-water bottling
plant, six wells, two recreation places and four bridges. The
total damage was estimated at 547 million roubles. The
estimated number of deaths is about 120. In reality, this
number could be considerably higher as unregistered
refugees from South Ossetia were said to have settled in
the overriden valley area.
Beginning on 25 September, experts of the Hydrome-
teorological Service, with the help of the Department of
Natural Resources and Preservation of the Environment,
organized hydrological measurements of the water level in
the dammed lake Gornaia Saniba. They determined
discharge of the Kauridon, Fardon and Genaldon rivers
which flow into the area of the ice/debris dam. Hydrological
observations of the water discharge in the Giseldon river
were also established in the Gisel region.
On 28 September, a control post was organized on the
rock spur above the ’Karmadon gates’ (the narrow entrance
to the gorge) to carry out 24 hour visual observation of the
situation at the dammed lakes, including radio retransmis-
sion of the data from the hydrological observations.
AVAILABLE INFORMATION
The most important documents forming the basis for an
assessment of what happened, and of likely scenarios, are
scientific publications about conditions and earlier events in
the region, eyewitness reports (very few), images and maps
compiled immediately after the event, and satellite imagery
which played a special role in this case.
Reports on earlier events
Hoinkes (1972) and Popovnin and others (2003) provide an
overview of the scientific literature concerning Kolka glacier
and special events in the Karmadon area. In 1835, a locality
known as Genal in the valley above Karmadon was
destroyed by an event which cannot be defined more
precisely. In 1902, two ice/rock slides killed 30 people near
the localities of Karmadon and Tmenikau (1700ma.s.l.)
and at Werkhni Karmadon (2300ma.s.l.) where a bath with
huts had been constructed at hot sulphurous sources
(temperatures of 44–558C) formerly covered by the snout
of Kolka glacier. A report by Poggenpohl (1903/05), who
visited the area in August of the same year (1902),
documents an event with many similarities to the recent
rock/ice slide but with a strikingly shorter runout path. This
report mentions that traces of two slides of 3 and 6 July were
visible and that a compact mass of snow, ice and rocks
covered the valley floor over a distance of 12 km. Large
blocks of ice had been thrown high up the slopes. The
source of the slides was clearly identified as being the north-
northeast wall of Dzhimarai-Khokh. Four hanging glaciers
fell on 3 July, passed over the tongue of Maili glacier and
covered the 12 km long path within 4min, indicating an
average travel speed of about 180 kmh–1. Two other hanging
glaciers fell 3 days later, forming an even larger slide. The
slides seemed to have advanced in gigantic waves as
interpreted from the traces in the valley. Flow height was
about 100m in the locality of the destroyed bath, with
individual blocks being thrown to heights of 140m.
Poggenpohl’s report makes no mention of any destructive
effects or instability related to Kolka glacier during these
events.
A surge of Kolka glacier started in the fall of 1969. By
1970, the glacier had advanced by 4.5 km. This event was
studied and described in detail by Khodakov (1974),
Rototaev (1974) and Rototaev and others (1983). During
this surge event, the heavily crevassed glacier advanced with
typical velocities of metres to a few tens of metres per day
over a total distance (4.5 km) exceeding its original length
(3 km), but without losing connection to its accumulation
area. With respect to flow velocities (metres per day vs
kilometres per hour) as well as internal coherence of the ice
(extreme longitudinal extension vs complete detachment),
the surge event of 1969/70 clearly differed from the events of
1902 (velocity) and 2002 (velocity, separation). Such
differences necessitate the use of terms like ‘avalanche’,
‘slide’ or ‘debris flow’, rather than ‘surge’, for the event of
2002. The classical surge of 1969/70, however, clearly
illustrates that the debris-covered Kolka glacier is able to
decouple from its (sediment) bed.
Eyewitnesses, images and maps
Mountain climbers who visited the valley and the source
area a few days before the event (around 10 September)
observed large changes with respect to an earlier visit in
2000 (e-mail report with digital photographs from A.
Glazovsky). Widespread mud-flows along the slope and in
the channel of the Karmadon river had demolished
previously existing trails and deposited ice, mud and stones
on river-banks. Rock- and icefall events continued unin-
terrupted over a distance of about 1 km from the walls of
Dzhimarai-Khokh, and three large lakes had formed in the
upper reaches of the river. Corresponding photographs
indicate extended sections of rock and ice in the source
wall, and adjacent slopes had been unstable (Fig. 4). Signs of
a surge or extraordinary flow behaviour (e.g. extreme
crevassing) of Kolka glacier were not obvious. Visible
surface water, however, might have indicated high sub-
glacial water pressure.
Fig. 4. Surface of Kolka glacier and north-northeast wall of
Dzhimarai-Khokh a few days before the event. Traces of strong
ice- and rock-fall activity within the lower part of the wall are
clearly visible. Photo taken by a group led by A. Falin.
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Personal reports of the event itself from people living near
the destruction zone are extremely scarce. A couple living at
a distance of only a few hundred metres from the left
(western) margin of the deposits explained to the authors
(W.H., A.P., I.Z and N.O.) that ‘a white cloud had come
through the dark’. Another person mentioned to government
representatives that he had heard ‘a noise like a heavy
construction machine’ while leaving the village of Gornaia
Saniba by car. The absence of any mention of extreme
sounds is striking; the enormous mass may have slid down in
a cloud of snow/water/ice/dust powder which absorbed
much of the acoustic energy. It seems to have arrived at
Karmadon as a sudden surprise to local inhabitants.
The most important observations carried out during the
first weeks after 21 September, and documented by
government representatives, include:
1. Aerial observations with photo and video surveys by local
experts (G. Dolgov, V. Drobyshev and A. Polkvoj on 21–
22 September 2002; I. Galushkin and O. Goncharenko
on 24–25 September and 6 October 2002; A. Karaev,
I. Galushkin and O. Goncharenko on 16 October 2002).
2. Ground observations with photo and video surveys by
experts in the area of the ice obstruction (I. Galushkin
and O. Goncharenko on 21–22 September 2002;
M. Bagov and U. Ilichev on 22–23 and 25 September
2002; W. Haeberli, C. Huggel, N. Osokin and I. Zotikov
on 3 October; E. Taratynko, A. Misetov and V. Adtseev on
24 October and 16 November 2002; I. Galushkin,
A. Misetov, A. Polkvoj and V. Adtseev on 15 and
23 February and 2 March 2003.
3. Observations by experts from the ice dam upwards along
Genaldon valley to Maili glacier tongue from 6 to 9 May
2003 (I. Galushkin, C. Huggel, A. Ka¨a¨b, A. Misetov,
S. Oswald and E. Zaporovzshenko).
4. 24 hour observations by the climber’s post from the spurs
of the rocky range in the region of the Karmadon gates
during October–November 2002.
Fig. 5. Oblique view to the Kazbek massif with approximate
direction of major faulting (red dashed and dash-dotted lines) and
hot-spring area (yellow circle) indicated. International Space
Station–Russian Program Uragan, 17 October 2002.
Fig. 6. ASTER images of 22 July 2001, 27 September 2002 and 29 September 2002, showing the avalanche path before and after the event.
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Documentation of observations was generally by digital
photographs and video footage; in some cases, negatives
made with film cameras were scanned and converted into
digital format. On 16 November, in addition to the usual
inspections, aerial photography was carried out from the
mouth of the Giseldon river to the tongue of Maili glacier
using an aerial camera with black-and-white film. The basis
for the cartography of the disaster area was a State
Topographical Map at a 1 : 200 000 scale, and selected
land-surveying plans at 1 : 10 000 scale from the 1980s to
1990s. On the morning of 22 September, a 1 : 200 000 map
of the whole affected zone and a special 1 : 10 000 map of
the ice obstruction and transit path were drawn on the basis
of information from the photographs and the video record-
ings. The morphology of the ice obstruction was detailed
afterwards (on 25 September) by means of a stadia survey
of its surface using a laser non-catoptric range-finder
(V. Drobyshev and V. Maklikov).
Satellite imagery
Difficult access conditions to the event starting zone and
poor current topographic information suggested the use of
satellite imagery for event reconstruction (Figs 5–7). High-
resolution satellite sensors such as the Landsat-7 Enhanced
Thematic Mapper Plus (ETM+; 15m ground resolution for
panchromatic band) and the Advanced Spaceborne Ther-
mal Emission and Reflection Radiometer (ASTER; 15m
ground resolution for visible and near-infrared bands
(VNIR)) support recognition of important indicators of
glacier-related hazards (e.g. avalanche and debris-flow
trajectories, glacier crevasses and glacial lakes). In particu-
lar, ASTER has proved to be very suitable for assessing
glacier hazards (Ka¨a¨b, 2002; Wessels and others, 2002;
Huggel and others, 2003; Ka¨a¨b and others, 2003a). Thanks
to their along-track stereo capability, ASTER data allow us
to generate digital elevation models (DEMs) (Ka¨a¨b, 2002;
Ka¨a¨b and others, 2003a), which form an essential com-
ponent in prediction and reconstruction of hazard events.
Recognizing the importance of documenting the Kolka
event, the ASTER science team at NASA’s Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, Pasadena, California, and the Japanese Earth
Remote Sensing Data Analysis Center (ERSDAC), Tokyo,
gave highest acquisition priority to this area (Ka¨a¨b and
others, 2003b). Advantage was taken of the ASTER VNIR
sensor’s cross-track pointing capabilities of up to 248,
which enables reduction of the normal 16 day nadir track
repeat period to just 2 days. ASTER was therefore a primary
information source and was used extensively for evaluating
the immediate flood hazards after the slide, and to
examine each of the event starting, transition and de-
position zones. The pre-event situation could be assessed
using 22 July 2001 and 3 October 2001 ASTER imagery. A
few days after the event, conditions were evaluated using
an ASTER image from 27 September 2002, whereas ASTER
images from 6 October 2002 and 22 October 2002 were
mainly used for remote observation of the hazards posed
by the lakes (Ka¨a¨b and others, 2003b). The 6 October 2002
stereo imagery has also been used for DEM generation
(Fig. 8). Soon after the event, it was realized that an
accurate topographic basis, necessarily exceeding ASTER’s
ground resolution, would be indispensable for reconstruc-
tion of the event and for subsequent hazard mitigation.
Therefore, a QuickBird satellite image from 25 September
2002 was acquired. QuickBird has recently emerged as the
commercial space-borne sensor with the highest ground
resolution, –0.6m in panchromatic and 2.4m in multi-
spectral mode. There is so far little experience of using
QuickBird imagery for glacier hazard studies, due to its
short operation time and high acquisition costs. First
investigations within this project indicate the high potential
of these data for detailed studies including planning.
Difficulties were encountered, however, with the proces-
sing of exactly ortho-rectified imagery since the high-
resolution DEMs and the high-accuracy ground-control
points needed for most accurate ortho-correction proces-
sing are usually not available in remote high-mountain
areas.
Fig. 7. Detail of the detachment zone from Quickbird image of
25 September 2002. Note black traces of rock instability to right of
the dark starting zone of the main event.
Fig. 8. ASTER scene of 6 October 2002, channels 1, 2 and 3N,
combined with ASTER DEM from the same image; resolution
resampled from 30 to 15m. Satellite data provided by Global
land Ice Measurements from Space (GLIMS), US Geological
Survey/NASA.
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RECONSTRUCTION AND ANALYSIS
It is useful to separately consider (1) the triggering events at
the north-northeast wall of Dzhimarai-Khokh and (2) the
complex flow processes starting with the erosion of major
parts of Kolka glacier.
Starting zone
One of the most urgent tasks was to assess the potential for an
immediate repetition of similar or even larger incidents at the
mountain slope. This involved interpretation of photographs
collected by the authorities during the reconnaissance flights,
together with some best guesses about thermal aspects
related to firn, ice and permafrost conditions in the starting
zone. The fact that two large slides from the same slope but
with considerably shorter runout distances had occurred in
1902, almost exactly 100 years before, constituted an import-
ant aspect of this assessment (Haeberli and others, 2003).
The slide starting zone (shown in Fig. 9) was located
between about 4300 and 3500ma.s.l. Approximately
4106m3 of steeply inclined metamorphic rock layers
were detached in the upper part of the slope to about 40m
depth, entraining a similar thickness/volume of snow, firn
and glacier ice. A system of fissures cuts through the bedrock
layers, and the slope of a dip in these layers, as visible in the
detachment zone after the event, was less than the inclin-
ation of the now exposed surface. In fact, the resulting
unsupported outcrops of steeply inclined bedrock layers in
the lower part of the affected slope (arrow in Fig. 9) could
have constituted an important geological influence on
stability conditions. In any case, the primary cause of the
instability must have been within the bedrock rather than in
the surface ice. In view of the fact that bedrock stability in
cold mountain areas can be especially low in warm or
degrading permafrost (Davies and others, 2001), thermal
conditions affecting ice and water within rock fissures are
likely to have exerted a major detrimental influence.
A weather station near Karmadon had been run between
1962 and 1987, showing a mean annual air temperature
(MAAT) of 5.98C. Assuming a warmer recent MAAT of about
78C at 1300 m a.s.l., and a MAAT lapse rate of
0.60.18C (100m)–1, present-day mean annual air tempera-
ture can be estimated at –628C at the lower and –1138C
at the upper end of the detachment zone. The existence of
creeping perennially frozen debris (active rock glaciers) in the
region (Fig. 10) confirms that the lower boundary of
discontinuous mountain permafrost is around 2500ma.s.l.,
where MAAT is slightly below 08C. Direct minilogger
measurements in the Alps (Gruber and others, 2003) indicate
mean annual rock temperatures tend to be somewhat higher
than air temperatures extrapolated from weather stations.
This effect, however, is to some degree compensated by the
fact that the affected slope is oriented away from the sun and
hence will be colder than average. In the absence of any
direct measurements or numerical model results, bedrock
surface temperatures in the detachment zone may be
estimated at about –5 to –108C, indicating bedrock condi-
tions of cold permafrost after the event.
During the years before the event, the slope had been
covered by a number of well-developed, spectacular
hanging glaciers. Such firn/ice bodies are known to have a
complex distribution of englacial temperatures. Vertical,
impermeable cliffs, where ablation takes place through ice
breaking off, can be as cold as the surrounding bedrock.
However, on the less steeply inclined upper surface where
snow accumulation takes place, permeable firn layers
underneath are strongly warmed by latent heat from
percolating and refreezing meltwater. In areas with MAAT
exceeding –10 to –128C, firn is usually temperate (Hooke
and others, 1983) and the ice/bedrock interface behind the
cold cliff remains at phase equilibrium temperature, a
pattern that introduces deep-seated thermal anomalies
within the underlying bedrock (Haeberli and others, 1997).
Based on work reported by A.B. Bazhev and B.Ya. Bazheva
in 1964, Kotlyakov and Krenke (1979) indeed indicate a
critical level of 3700–3800ma.s.l. for firn areas in the
Caucasus to be cold, with mean annual firn temperature
reaching –88C at high altitudes of the Kazbek massif. It is
therefore highly probable that the detachment zone at
Dzhimarai-Khokh was in a complex condition of relatively
cold and thick permafrost combined with warm if not
unfrozen parts and meltwater flow in very steeply inclined
materials with heterogeneous permeability. This situation,
favouring high and strongly variable water pressures, was
further complicated by the fact that hot springs occur in this
volcanic region of Kazbek (the name Karmadon, or ‘warm
water’, relates to hot springs in the valley). Steam/dust (?)
clouds, visible in photographs and satellite images at the
foot of the slope for days after the event, contained sulphur,
as evidenced by the strong odour mentioned by a
reconnaissance team which tried to access the site by
helicopter. It was assumed that the sulphur gas originated
from the slide initiation zone and may relate to geothermal
activity. This interpretation, however, remains controversial,
as continued rock/icefalls or deposited and remobilized dust
at the main impact site could also produce the dusty clouds
visible on photographs and satellite images. Later visits by
authors of this paper (C.H. and A.K.) showed no trace of
enhanced snowmelting from hot springs in the area of
Fig. 9. Starting zone of the Kolka-Karmadon rock/ice slide in the
highest part of the north-northeast wall of the summit of Dzhimarai-
Khokh (blue arrow points to vertical cut through hanging glacier
and bedrock). The general dip of the layering within the meta-
morphic rocks is indicated with green dashed lines, two general
directions of fracturing with red dash-dotted lines, the inclination of
the main slope and failure plain with yellow lines. With the general
slope cutting through the less steep layering, unsupported outcrops
of steeply inclined rock layers formed (red arrows). Temperature
indications refer to exposed rock surfaces/vertical ice cliffs and to
firn surfaces of hanging glaciers. Photo: I. Galushkin, 25 September
2002.
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impact or in the wall of Dzhimarai-Khokh. Evidence from
field observations at the site on the potential existence of hot
springs and gas liberation therefore remains uncertain.
Flow path
The most extraordinary aspects of the Kolka slide event are
the erosion of large parts of Kolka glacier, the high velocity
attained and the long travel distance.
According to photographic documents and visitor reports,
steep rock sections and hanging glaciers in the eastern part
of the 20 September starting zone had already failed during
the period July–September 2002. A total volume of
4–7 106m3 of freshly deposited ice and rock debris had
accumulated on Kolka glacier, causing its thickness to
increase by some 10% and forming a ramp-type geometry
at the transition from the mountain wall to the glacier surface
(cf. Petrakov and others, 2004). Shortly before the main
event, lakes were observed in the affected glacier area, and
repeated debris flows reaching some distance down-valley
indicated special hydraulic conditions with probable high
en-/subglacial water pressures. Even though signs of accel-
erated glacier movement (such as heavy crevassing or fast
front advance) were not reported, extraordinary conditions
(asymmetric additional load at the foot of Dzhimarai-Khokh
causing a redirection of flow towards the left glacier margin
away from the unstable wall, and decoupling of the glacier
from its probably soaked sediment bed under conditions of
extreme water pressure) are likely to have existed shortly
before and during the critical time. The rock/icefall of
20 September 2002 had a drop height of 900–1000m before
impacting Kolka glacier which slopes away from the bottom
of the Dzhimarai-Khokh north-northeast wall over a length of
3 km at an inclination of about 5–108. The impact event
resulted in erosion and complete deplacement of (a roughly
estimated) 60–75% (80 106m3) of the mass of Kolka
glacier to 40–60m depth (data provided by Petrakov and
others (2004) from comparison with earlier photographs).
Thus, the glacier was detached along a line parallel to the
foot of the Dzhimarai-Khokh wall, leaving a pronounced scar
(Fig. 10), and pushed (upwards) towards its left lateral
moraine and in the down-valley direction (Fig. 11).
Details of the processes involved with the mobilization of
large masses of Kolka glacier remain open to speculation,
especially concerning the exact volume of rock and ice
falling from the mountain onto the glacier to trigger its
elimination. Reasonable scenarios can be constructed. The
enormous acceleration (from less than metres per day to tens
of metres per second) of the activated glacier/debris mass
over a very short distance (a few kilometres or roughly one
glacier length; see below) requires a large impact and
effective energy transmission from the mass falling onto the
glacier. This large impact on the glacier may have resulted in
a shock wave that may then have acted as a trigger for
erosion and formation of the main slide. The accumulation
in ramp-type form of large amounts of ice and debris from
earlier failure of hanging glaciers and rock masses may have
reduced the impact angle on the glacier, of the rock/ice mass
which had been falling and sliding down from the upper part
Fig. 10. Upper avalanche path of the Kolka-Karmadon rock/ice slide. The summit of Dzhimarai-Khokh and the detachment zone are in the
background; Kazbek volcano is to the left (outside the image). Red arrows point to active talus-derived rock glacier in the lower right corner,
steam (?) or dust (?) cloud at the foot of the slope where Kolka glacier has been sheared off and overridden the tongue of Maili glacier. Flow
directions of two different and subsequent flow phases are indicated with yellow arrows. Photo: I. Galushkin, 25 September 2002.
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of the Dzhimarai-Khokh wall. In fact, this falling/sliding
mass could have hit the glacier almost tangentially, and with
very high velocity. In addition, the glacier was relatively
thin, on a soaked bed, already largely decoupled, and had
an irregular, debris-covered and lake-affected surface. The
low-angle impact from the wall (1 in Fig. 11) could be
indicated by the relatively small but clear signal in the
seismogram (Fig. 14 below) and may have had a sequence of
effects: the impact probably shattered the glacier and
pushed it towards the left lateral moraine. Some ice debris
was thereby thrown over, and deposited behind, the moraine
ridge (2 in Fig. 11). The moraine itself deflected the flow
direction of the main avalanche and eroded glacier mass, at
an angle of roughly 308 towards the main valley, squeezing
out a first (minor) splash across the lower part of the left
lateral moraine (3 in Fig. 11), of muddy supra- and
subglacial water together with water from ice melting
through direct impact (probably <1 106m3; cf. C. Huggel
and others, in GRNO-A, 2004). The main deflected mass
then crossed the glacier forefield towards the right lateral
moraine (4 in Fig. 11) where it was deflected towards the
valley again, squeezing out a second (much larger) splash of
water with mobilized ice and rock debris. This large second
splash formed a high-speed debris flow which started
travelling behind the right lateral moraine (5 in Fig. 11)
and overrode the tongue of Maili glacier (at 2800ma.s.l.) at
very high speed but without strongly eroding its relatively
clean ice (Fig. 10). The main, and probably less liquid, mass
followed at slightly lower speed along the inside of the right
lateral moraine (6 in Fig. 11) towards the left valley slope
again. After passing the gap between the right lateral
moraine of Kolka glacier and the left lateral moraine of
Maili glacier, temporarily dammed distal parts of the debris
flow on the external moraine side started flowing across the
track of the main mass (7 in Fig. 11), clearly indicating that
the two main flow phases were intimately coupled.
The catastrophic acceleration and complete detachment
of an almost entire glacier by the impact from an ice/rock
avalanche is extremely unusual. Well-known historical
cases of ice/rock avalanches onto relatively small mountain
glaciers had no comparable effects. In the case of
Huascara´n, Peru, in 1970 (Lliboutry, 1975; Plafker and
Ericksen, 1978; Ko¨rner, 1983), a much larger rock/icefall
(than at Dzhimarai-Khokh) impacted onto a relatively clean,
steep mountain glacier but did not detach it. In a similar
way, a rock/icefall from the Fletschhorn in 1901 (Coaz,
1910; Alean, 1984), with volumes comparable to the
Dzhimarai-Khokh case, impacted onto the debris-covered
Rossboden glacier on its elevated sediment bed in the Swiss
Alps without destabilizing or eroding it. During the 1974
surge of Didal glacier, Central Asia, an ice avalanche with a
volume of about 1.5106m3 formed at the glacier front but
Fig. 11. Impact zone where Kolka glacier was eroded. Numbers refer to important parts of the triggering mechanism (cf. text): 1. main impact
from wall; 2. ice debris thrown across left lateral moraine; 3. first (minor) splash of mud at lower end of left lateral moraine; 4. start of swing-
like flow of the main mass due to deflection at left- then right-lateral moraine of Kolka glacier; 5. second (large) splash of mud forming fast
mud/debris flow outside the right lateral moraine of Kolka glacier and across the tongue of Maili glacier; 6. slightly slower flow of main mass
along inside of right lateral moraine; 7. temporarily blocked distal parts of fast mud/debris flow (5), crossing gap between right lateral
moraine of Kolka glacier and left lateral moraine of Maili glacier and flowing across traces of main mass after its passage. Photo:
I. Galushkin, 25 September 2002.
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left the remaining part of the glacier intact and without
interruption of the surge movement (personal communica-
tion from A. Yablokow to J. Schneider, Vienna, 2004).
Neither high impact energy, high water pressure and surge-
type accelerated sliding, debris cover/sediment bed nor thin
ice on steep slopes appears to be a critical individual factor
for the detachment of an entire glacier. It must therefore be
assumed that a combination of critical factors is required to
lead to the preconditions enabling extraordinary develop-
ments such as have taken place at Kolka glacier.
Below Kolka and Maili glaciers, the two phases of the
slide encountered a bend in the valley of nearly 908 to the
north. This sharp turn in flow direction caused a super-
elevation of the first (more liquid) flow phase, of about
200m with a maximum of 250m (Fig. 12; Ka¨a¨b and others,
2003b). Corresponding velocity calculations (Chow, 1959;
Evans and Clague, 2001) based on v ¼ ðgdr=bÞ0:5, where v
is flow velocity, g is gravitational acceleration, d is super-
elevation, r is centre-line radius of curvature and b is
channel width, yield a maximum of 70–90m s–1 (250–
325 kmh–1) with r =1500m, b =600m and d =200–250m.
At the location of the super-elevation, traces of the second
flow phase (the main and less liquid mass) confirm that the
second phase was moving somewhat less fast, as indicated
by the lower super-elevation (see comments on possible
impact processes mentioned earlier). Further down-valley,
the flow depth along the north-facing Genaldon valley was
60–150m, with repeated super-elevations of up to 200m.
Though the Genaldon valley is relatively straight, the super-
elevations are striking features along the flow path with
upward and downward movement at an inclination of
approximately 158. The observed super-elevations (Fig. 13)
imply a swing-like movement of the slide, suggesting the
flow of a compact mass. The occurrence on opposite valley
flanks of parallel super-elevations indicates the existence of
at least two flow phases. This is confirmed by flow traces at
some places where a first mass, clearly intersected at
horozontal angles of several tens of degrees, was overridden
by a second phase. Parallel super-elevations, however, could
also be a consequence of longitudinal compression/exten-
sion of the flow. The trimlines could mostly be recognized
by ice/debris deposits of the slide. Beyond the trimline, the
terrain is characterized by a zone located 10–30m upwards
with deposition of debris ranging from fine-grained to 30 cm
boulders. In the same zone, shrubs and small trees were
skipped. These effects are likely to be assigned to the dust
part of the slide containing significant amounts of ice, debris
and smaller boulders. However, indications of a large dust
avalanche (e.g. strong uphill throwing of trees), such as
occurs sometimes with ice and snow avalanches, was not
observed in any of the flow-path sections.
At the widening of the valley near Karmadon, flow depth
and velocity decreased and flow spreading was observed.
The main mass of the slide was eventually stopped and
dammed at the entrance of the narrow Genaldon gorge.
Given v ¼ ð2ghÞ0:5 (Chow, 1959), with observed run-up
heights, h, of 30–40m at the first and direct impact of the
mass onto the slope slightly to the east of the gorge, the
flow velocity is estimated at about 20–30m s–1 (70–
120 kmh–1). The average flow velocity of the slide was
reconstructed using the seismic record events (Fig. 14)
assumed to be from the impacting masses on Kolka glacier,
and the breaking of the power lines at Karmadon. The
resulting mean velocity of 50–80m s–1 (180–280 kmh–1) is
enormous considering the moderate slope of the Genaldon
valley between the Maili glacier tongue and Karmadon
(5–68). Similarly high velocities of 50–60 m s–1
(200 kmh–1) have been reported from rock slides but on
much steeper slopes (Evans and Clague, 2001). Debris flows
on steep volcanic flanks have reached velocities of up to
40m s–1 (nearly 150 kmh–1; Pierson, 1995). Possible rea-
sons for the extreme velocity at Karmadon include
lubrication effects in the mass travelling down-valley.
Lubrication may have been enabled by water or air
entrained at the bottom of the mass. The initial drop of
the slide probably produced considerable amounts of liquid
water by melting of ice caused by internal friction and
impact energy (Ka¨a¨b and others, 2003b). Similar processes
have been reported from other locations (e.g. Huascara´n:
Plafker and Ericksen, 1978; Ko¨rner, 1983). During the initial
fall process, air may also have been entrained and may
subsequently have contributed to the high velocities.
Fig. 13. Waveform traces of avalanche motion along path towards
Karmadon. Photo: I. Galushkin, 19 October 2002.
Fig. 12. Site (below Maili glacier) of the main turning to the left of
the avalanche mass. Red arrows point to scree slopes and active
rock glacier; yellow arrows indicate traces of two different and
subsequent (1 then 2) flow phases with different super-elevation in
the external part of the turn, reflecting higher (1)/lower (2) flow
velocity. Photo: I. Galushkin, 25 September 2002.
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While the main ice masses were dammed at the entrance
of the Genaldon gorge, water and fine sediment from the
first flow phase (and/or expelled as a consequence of the
extreme compression of the fast sliding ice/debris/water/air
mass) caused the formation of a debris/mud-flow, which
travelled down the gorge and joined the Giseldon river,
eventually running out about 15 km from the gorge entrance
(Fig. 15). Since the slope gradients of the flow channel are
rather low (68 in the upstream and 38 in the downstream
area) the sediment concentration probably did not exceed
40% by volume. The large volume of the mud-flow (a few
million m3) certainly contributed to a longer travel distance.
Field observations also indicate that considerable amounts
of sediment transported by the summer 2002 floods (rainfall
events) were remobilized. Based on trimline evidence, the
flow depth of the debris/mud-flow was estimated at 5–15m
in the upper part and 3–8m in the lower part of the path.
Flow velocity was likely to be in the range 5–10m s–1
(15–40 kmh–1). More detailed parameters for a thorough
velocity calculation are not yet available. About 4 km
downstream from the mud-flow runout zone, a highway
bridge at the town of Gisel has a discharge capacity of
200m3 s–1 (personal communication from L. Valieva, 2003).
Interestingly, there was only normal discharge observed at
this bridge during the entire debris/mud-flow event. The
exact reasons for the cessation of the flow (loss of water into
the ground, material exhaustion, undercritical flow depth) so
far remain unclear. Attempts to apply numerical model
calculations concerning the dynamics of the entire flow are
underway (M. Swartz and others in GRNO-A, 2004).
ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING OF IMMINENT
HAZARDS
Starting zone
After the slide, an assessment of the potential for an
immediate repetition of a similar or even larger event was
based on the facts that (1) the disappearance of hanging
glaciers with warm firn areas had reduced the load on the
slope and eliminated the main meltwater source, (2) the
exposed bedrock would now be subject to strong cooling
and deep freezing, (3) the sheared-off ice/debris volume of
Kolka glacier had made large mass increase of potential
future ice/rock falls at the foot of the slope impossible and
(4) the path of the 20 September event with its heavy
destruction was practically inaccessible. It was concluded
that the likelihood of repetition at the same site and in the
immediate future of an equally sized or even larger incident
could be considered minimal, but that instabilities in the
remaining parts of the slope could continue and should be
observed. The build-up of hanging glaciers with complex
thermal conditions over long times, in combination with
thermal water in the region and the specific geological
setting (steeply inclined rock layers, volcanic/geothermal
processes), could explain the ‘quasi-periodicity’ of events at
the century time-scale. The effects of potential future
atmospheric warming also need to be taken into account
during the coming decades.
Dammed lakes
The ice/debris masses deposited by the slide at Karmadon
began to dam river flow and led to the formation of several
lakes after the slide. The largest lake developed at the
settlement of Saniba at the southeast end of the ice dam. As
soon as 5 days after the slide, the lake had an area of
192 000m2 according to QuickBird satellite data. The
maximum size of the lake was reached by 20 October
2002, with an estimated volume of 4–5106m3 (cf. Ka¨a¨b
and others, 2003b). The rising lake level flooded numerous
houses at Saniba. Additionally, several lakes of variable size
formed at the left (western) margin of the ice/debris dam.
Fig. 15. Mud-flow below the Genaldon gorge. Note completely
covered river bed, eliminated forest stands and buried access road.
Photo: I. Galushkin, 25 September 2002.
Fig. 14. Seismic record: 20 September 2002, 16:08:35, station
‘Fiagdon’, Geophysical Center for Experimental Diagnostics,
Russian Academy of Sciences. Arrows point to possible signals of
low-angle impact on Kolka glacier. Detailed analysis from several
stations seems to be difficult and is not yet available (cf.
contribution by V. Zaalishvili and N. Nevskaya in GRNO-A, 2004).
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Based on lake area measurements using QuickBird imagery,
it was estimated that 5 days after the slide a total of 5–
6106m3 of water was dammed by the ice/debris deposits.
The large amount of water dammed gave rise to serious
concern for the stability of the ice/debris dam and fears of
possible severe downstream flooding.
Assessing the stability of such a dam of broken ice/rock
debris is complex, and the necessary experience is largely
missing. Theoretically, ice dams can fail by various
mechanisms such as sudden burst, overflow, dam floatation
or progressive enlargement of en-/subglacial channels
(Haeberli, 1983; Walder and Costa, 1996; Tweed and
Russell, 1999). Expected discharges are related to the failure
mechanism where sudden bursts show maximum values. A
sudden burst, however, was highly unlikely at Karmadon
due to the large dimensions of the ice dam (2 km along the
pre-dam stream). Dam floatation was also considered
unlikely because the dam consisted of (roughly estimated)
20% of debris/rock, which prevents a dam from flotation in
accordance with density considerations (Tweed, 2000).
More probable scenarios were dam overflow or formation
of drainage channels on, in or underneath the ice/debris
deposits, including potential channel collapse with tem-
porary damming and sudden breakage.
As there was no way to observe the ongoing processes
within and under the ice/debris dam, the monitoring
concept was based on control of inflow to, and outflow
from, the ice/debris dam. Outflow measurements at the
lower end of the dam itself were complicated due to the
inaccessibility of the area in the gorge (frequent ice- and
rock falls). Discharge measurements had therefore to be
made some kilometres further downstream. Saniba lake,
however, was under continuous observation. A constant lake
level rise was measured in the period 20 September–
22 October 2002. In order to assess a sudden discharge from
Saniba lake and potential downstream flooding effects, a
critical threshold of the rate of lake lowering was deter-
mined. The threshold was set at 0.1mh–1 as this would
roughly double the observed discharge and most likely mark
the beginning of a potentially dangerous outburst process. If
the threshold was exceeded, or discharge became suddenly
blocked, a series of control and safety procedures were to be
activated (including the possible evacuation of inhabitants of
Gisel to more elevated ground). Activation of such
procedures was not necessary. A moderate drop in the level
of Saniba lake began after 22 October 2002, by natural
formation of drainage channels (Fig. 16). Emergency
interventions at the ice/debris dam, such as channel excav-
ation or even dam destruction by explosives, were dis-
regarded after careful evaluation, mainly due to inefficiency
in relation to the enormous dam dimensions.
Expert judgment and recommendations
The following notes were prepared and signed by
W. Haeberli and I. Zotikov, representing the Swiss Humani-
tarian Aid Unit and the Russian Academy of Sciences,
respectively (original text in italics: the term ‘orographic’
here means ‘in the direction of flow’):
1. The Kolka-Karmadon event of 20 September 2002 is
clearly recognized to have been an ice/rock avalanche
(characteristic range of travel speed: hundreds of kmh–1)
and not a glacier surge (accelerated glacier flow);
2. this ice/rock avalanche represents a unique and
catastrophic event of historical dimension;
3. as such, this event was unforeseeable – exact prediction
would have been difficult even with advanced expert
techniques;
4. the physical conditions and processes leading to the
departure of the ice mass in the steep mountain slope
are, and will continue to be, difficult to assess; any
human influence on the triggering can be safely
excluded and the possibility of a repetition at the same
site in the immediate future is considered minimal;
5. corresponding hazards of smaller dimensions, however,
exist in many high-mountain areas of the world and
should be considered in delineating regional hazard
zones;
6. as a consequence, the Kolka-Karmadon case should be
documented and the information made available to the
public and the scientific community by the group of
experts now active;
Fig. 16. Changes in lake level recorded at Gornaia Saniba. The red dashed line indicates critical rate of level change as defined for possible
beginning of outburst and initiating alarm concept in down-valley settlements.
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7. an adequate group of experts should also accompany
the evolution of the situation and help the authorities
with planning appropriate measures;
8. this is necessary, because the formation of lakes at and
on the avalanche deposits continues to constitute a
threat to local as well as down-valley settlements and
their inhabitants;
9. at present – and most likely during autumn 2002 – low
lake levels, decreasing discharge in the upstream rivers,
an already functioning hydraulic system on the oro-
graphic left, cooling air/water temperatures and a still
thick avalanche deposit make a sudden outburst of the
lake dammed on the orographic right unlikely;
10. due to the fact that the situation is complex and not fully
controllable, careful observation of the lake and the ice
dam is of fundamental importance;
11. the present situation allows for attempts to facilitate
emptying of the lake at the orographic right by
constructive measures (surface channel);
12. however, the combined effects of snowmelt with
increased river discharge and accelerated disintegration
of the ice dam in spring/summer 2003 could create a
critical situation if lake levels rise and volumes of
dammed water increase;
13. for such a case, important activities have to be foreseen
and prepared already during winter time, including
either pumping/siphoning of water at high rates and/or
planning of evacuation of the population in down-valley
areas potentially affected by flood waves, which could
be on the order of several hundreds to even 1000–
2000m3 s–1 of water and mud;
14. on a longer term, climate change may introduce
pronounced changes in high-mountain conditions,
especially with respect to snow, ice, water and the
involved system of surface processes;
15. it would be advisable to monitor and investigate the
evolution on the Ossetian part of the Caucasus with the
help of international cooperation and modern technol-
ogies (remote sensing, precision surveying, numerical
modeling of spatial conditions, etc.).
The work of the local authorities and environmental experts
(especially aerial reconnaissance flights, mapping of the
deposit, observational network, rescue actions and commu-
nications with experts) in a most unusual and delicate
situation was considered to have been fully adequate and of
excellent quality. Collaboration between the different parts
of the action was most fruitful and hopefully will continue
into the future.
In the meantime, the lake level has lowered in the
expected slow mode and has fortunately stayed low during
spring and summer 2003, making additional flood protec-
tion work unnecessary. The possibility of sudden collapses
within the debris dam (Fig. 17) and intermittent damming of
the river, with a potentially following mechanical burst and
corresponding sharp flood peak (cf. Haeberli, 1983; Walder
and Costa, 1996), makes the continuation of careful
observations necessary.
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS TO LEARN
The most remarkable aspects related to the extraordinary
case of the recent Kolka-Karmadon rock/ice slide are:
1. two similar but smaller events from the same mountain
slope had already occurred in 1902, indicating espe-
cially delicate but not well-understood conditions in the
starting zone, and
2. the extreme length of the slide/mud-flow trajectory is
probably due to the unique entrainment of large ice
volumes from a (debris-covered valley) glacier, to the
resulting combination of rock, snow/firn/ice, debris and
water within the sliding mass and to the correspondingly
high flow velocities.
This ice/rock fall was a tragic and hardly foreseeable event of
historical dimensions. In more densely populated mountain
ranges, a similar event could cause a catastrophe of
enormous dimensions. In view of this possibility, as much
as possible should be learned from the experience and
documentation made available. Lessons include the rela-
tively trivial but most important, and nevertheless often
neglected, fact that severe catastrophic events in high
mountain regions typically involve a multitude of factors
and require integrated consideration of complex chains of
processes, a task that must be undertaken by correspond-
ingly qualified groups of interdisciplinary experts (Ka¨a¨b
and others, in press). Special attention must be paid to
(a) interactions of permafrost, hanging glaciers and bedrock
structure in steep high-altitude slopes, (b) the potential
erosion and mobilization of entire glaciers as a consequence
of high-energy impacts from falling rock/ice masses onto
Fig. 17. Collapse structures in avalanche deposit in fall 2003.
Photo: I. Galushkin, 23 September 2003.
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glaciers, with still-to-be-defined critical combinations of
factors such as high water pressure, additional surface load
by debris and water, decoupling from soaked sediment beds
and irregular surface topography/ice thickness of down-
wasting debris-covered glaciers, and (c) the transformation
of rock/icefalls into debris flows, powder (snow) avalanches
and debris/mud-flows traveling at high speeds over large
distances. This integrated consideration of such complex
interrelations now forms the basis for a cooperative project
involving the responsible authorities, and international
collaboration of scientists has been initiated (cf. contribu-
tions by S.A. Baskaev and others, C. Huggel and others and
S. Oswald and others in GRNO-A, 2004).
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